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According to the United Nations, there are over 300,000 child soldiers operating 
throughout the world and the potential that U.S. soldiers will interact with child soldiers 
remains significant. Military doctrine, policy, and training have been updated to take the 
current operational environment into consideration. The same cannot be said for the 
interaction with child soldiers. This thesis will begin to identify and address gaps in the 
current Army policy and doctrine concerning child soldiers. Additionally, this thesis will 
begin to identify ways to bridge the gaps identified in order to address how U.S. soldiers 
can best be prepared when they confront child soldiers on the battlefield. This research 
identifies that there is a rising issue concerning child soldiers, but that the U.S. Army has 
failed to implement the necessary changes to support its soldiers in dealing with this 
when they deploy. The Army references international treaties that the United States is not 
a party to in order to provide guidance to soldiers concerning child soldiers. This 
guidance needs to be codified, implemented, and distributed to support soldiers that 
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Around 1020 BC, a young boy used a slingshot to knock down an adult soldier, 
prior to cutting off his head. This is a story most people have heard and it has become 
familiar in popular culture, with references to underdog stories. Before David fought 
Goliath, King Saul said to David, “you are not able to go out against [Goliath] and fight 
him; you are only a boy, and he has been a fighting man from his youth.”1 This is 
probably one of the earliest written accounts of a child soldier, but it has not been the last. 
During the American Civil War, writings about child soldiers “celebrated the nobility and 
sacrifice of young boys in battle.”2 Even more recently, non-state actors have used print3 
and video propaganda celebrating and depicting child soldiers conducting training in 
basic infantry tactics4 and executing captives.5 The Islamic State (ISIS) is also 
publicizing the training of child soldiers within schools, such as the “School of Jihad” 
and the “Al-Farouq Institute for Islamic State Cubs.”6  
This topic has received a significant amount of attention, with numerous books 
and articles written on the employment and recruitment of child soldiers. Most recently, 
in the first quarter of 2016, the Center for Combating Terrorism and Quilliam, a counter-
extremist think-tank based in London, has published reports concerning the impact of 
                                                 
1 Life Application Study Bible: New International Version (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers 
Inc. 1997), 1 Samuel 17:33. 
2 David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young, Child Soldiers in the War on Terrorism (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 6.  
3 “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” Dabiq 8, (March 2015): 20–21. 
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-8e280b3.pdf. 
4 “ISIS Releases New Photos and Video Showing Training of Child Soldiers,” YouTube video, 2:13, 
from ISIS Propaganda, posted by “Joao Paulo,” April 9, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=34YkQt9Y93M. 
5 “ISIS Child Executing Alleged Israeli Spy,” YouTube video, 1:20, from the Fox News Channel, 
posted by “Hamid Bayati,” March 10, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vy_9RoJH_go. 
6 Adam Withnall, “Inside the ‘School of Jihad’: Isis Militants Release Shocking Videos Showing what 




child soldiers by examining the increase in the use of child soldiers in extremist 
propaganda.7 These publications, along with the numerous other books that have been 
published include: Children at War, Armies of the Young, and Child Soldiers A Reference 
Handbook. Although these works are very informative from an academic point of view, 
they are not geared toward the military per se.  
The U.S. Army addresses the topic of child soldiers very briefly within its 
doctrine by simply identifying that “planning for Army operations accounts for the 
possibility of vulnerable children and child-soldiers among enemy forces.”8 Although 
this manual states that Army planning takes children into consideration, it fails to 
describe how planning accounts for child soldiers, or what specifically needs to be 
addressed. I will address this significant gap relating to the planning phase as well as 
identify gaps and contradictions in other phases. Additionally, this thesis will begin to 
identify ways to begin to bridge the gaps identified.  
 The United States Army needs to consider child soldiers through all phases of 
operations, not solely the planning phase. These phases are outlined in Joint Publication 
5–0, beginning with what the military calls “phase 0” and ending at “phase V.” These 
phases are shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil 
authority.9 Within each of these phases are actions that should occur in order to 
accomplish the mission. During the first two phases, shape and deter, a unit should 
prepare and define the problem. During the following two phases, seize and dominate, a 
unit executes combat operations. The final two phases, stabilize and enable civil 
authorities, are meant for transition of responsibilities.10 I will simply follow the three 
                                                 
7 Mia Bloom, John Horgan, and Charlie Winter, “Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic 
State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015–2016,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 2 (2016): 29–32 and Noman Benotman 
and Nikita Malik, “The Children of Islamic State,” Quilliam, March 2016, 
https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-children-of-islamic-
state.pdf.  
8 Department of the Army, Protection of Civilians (ADTP 3–07.6) (Washington, DC: US Army 
Publishing Directorate, October 2015), 2–5.  
9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5–0) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, August 2011), xxiii–xxiv.  
10 Janet A. St Laurent et al., Military Operations. Actions Needed to Improve DoD’s Stability 
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning (GAO-07–549) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007), 15.  
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general phases of military operations, which coincide with the phase 0-V listed above: 
preparation (shape and deter), execution (seize the initiative and dominate), and 
stabilization (stabilize and enable civil authorities). These phases coincide with planning, 
execution, and follow on operations, which are the key components to any and all 
situations whether in a training environment or during actual operations.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, in the preparation and execution phases, I will explain tactical 
level analysis regarding child soldiers and suggest recommendations that can be made at 
this level.  In the final section of this thesis, stabilization phase, I will focus more on 
operational and strategic level analysis and suggest recommendations for these as well.    
As shortcomings are identified, within a specific phase, I recommend possible 
changes that can be made and/or incorporated to support U.S. soldiers that will encounter 
child soldiers. Properly addressing these gaps with substantive guidelines on the 
engagement of child soldiers will be a significant undertaking far beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  In this research, I primarily identify these gaps and provide a basic outline to 
address the possibility to begin developing such a policy. If soldiers do not address the 
issues surrounding child soldiers there is a greater chance that conflicts will be prolonged.  
The increase in the possibility of interacting with child soldiers has been outlined 
in public laws and congressional reports;11 however, the U.S. military remains 
unprepared for encounters with them on the battlefield, as I will show through this study. 
If the U.S. Army continues to be unprepared for this continuing trend, a unit’s lack of 
preparedness, performance, mission success, and aftermath of operations, can affect 
soldiers both mentally and physically. If this is true, then there should be a concerted 
effort to increase emphasis on training and doctrine, as it relates to child soldiers. Military 
studies should include an operational context, which will provide knowledge and 
understanding as to what actions soldiers could take when confronted with these children 
                                                 
11 Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public Law No. 
111–172, 124 Stat. 1209 (2009) and Alexis Arieff, Lauren P. Blanchard, and Thomas F. Husted, The Lord’s 
Resistance Army: The U.S. Response (CRS Report No. R42094) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2015).  
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on the battlefield. Pete W. Singer makes a valid point when he states “to remain relevant, 
military studies must address all the new actors in warfare, even the littlest ones.”12 
B. BACKGROUND 
The use of child soldiers is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, child 
soldiers have been used on both sides, and their use is not limited to terrorists or non-state 
actors. During the middle ages, a boy as young as 14 could become a squire and be 
assigned to a knight to begin his military training.13 During the 17th century, the British 
Royal Navy gave children the title of “powder monkey,” while they worked on Navy 
vessels and reloaded cannons.14 The American Civil War is sometimes referred to as “the 
boy’s war.”15 Some estimate that more than a million child soldiers, 18 or younger, 
served during the Civil War;16 other scholars have estimated the numbers to be 
significantly lower, between 250,000–420,000.17 However, whether 1 million or 250,000, 
this is a significant number, considering that the current estimate of child soldiers is 
approximately 300,000 worldwide although this number is growing.18  
In order to identify the current policy and doctrine, or lack thereof, surrounding 
child soldiers, it is important to define what constitutes a child soldier. The first formal 
acknowledgement of the needs of children, under international law, was in 1924, by the 
League of Nations, in the “Declaration of the Rights of the Child.” However, it was not 
until another 65 years had passed, when the international community officially 
acknowledged the “very special status of children.”19 Even though it was identified in 
                                                 
12 Pete W. Singer, “Caution: Children at War,” Parameters 31, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 41. 
13 Christopher Gravett, English Medieval Knight 1300–1400 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 16.  
14 Terry Breverton, The Pirate Dictionary (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 2004), 130.  
15 Rosen, Armies of the Young, 5.  
16 Burke Davis, The Civil War, Strange & Fascinating Facts (Ann Arbor, MI: Fairfax Press, 1960), 
63.  
17 Emmy E. Werner, Reluctant Witnesses: Children’s Voices from the Civil War (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1998), 2.  
18 Graça Machel, International Conference on War-affected Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children (Winnipeg, Canada: United Nations, 1996), 5.  
19 Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 55.  
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1924 that specific needs of children should be addressed, the four original Geneva 
Conventions failed to do so.20  
It was not until 1977 that Additional Protocol I was added to the Geneva 
Convention, which specifically defined the minimum age of child soldiers. This protocol 
codified that to enlist in the military a child had to be at least 15 years old. This definition 
lasted until 1998, when a report titled The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children was 
published. This report led to an event called the “Cape Town Symposium,” which 
brought experts together to develop strategies for dealing with child soldiers. The event 
resulted in the publication of The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices.21 This 
document stated, “a minimum age of 18 years should be established for any person 
participating in hostilities.”22 It is often referred to as the “Straight-18” definition, 
relating to child soldiers. Even though the Cape Town Symposium occurred in 1998, the 
findings did not become the international standard until 2002 with the establishment of an 
international treaty called the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. These documents set forth the 
minimum age of 18 years old as a requirement for international armed conflicts and civil 
wars. However, they do not address the age requirements for wars of national 
liberation.23 Then, in 2007, The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
conducted a review of the Cape Town Principles, which resulted in the Paris Principles 
and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups. During 
this review, the definition of child soldiers only as combatants was abandoned and was 
expanded in favor of “any child associated with an armed group or armed force,” to 
include noncombatant roles such as cooks and messengers.24  
                                                 
20 Rosen, Armies of the Young, 139. 
21 David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 
2012), 52.  
22 United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund, “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices,” United 
Nations, April 30, 1997, 1, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf. 
23 Rosen, Armies of the Young, 143. 
24 Rosen, Child Soldiers, 52.  
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It is important to note that the United States is neither party to the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, nor were its representatives present during the 
conference that resulted in the Paris Principles.25 However, the U.S. adopted a similar 
definition of child soldier in 2008. The United States outlines its definition of child 
soldier in the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008, which is consistent with the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Child Soldier Prevention Act 
identifies a child soldier as any individual conscripted under the age of 18, or any 
individual under the age of 15 who volunteers and also includes children serving as 
cooks, messengers, medics, or sex slaves. 
The age at which a child is considered to reach adulthood varies between cultures, 
and depends on factors that include, but are not limited to, social development, cognitive 
aptitude, and emotional maturity. On the other hand, legally, there needs to be a defined 
age in order to hold nations to a set standard. The age of 18 has become the most 
accepted age at which children become adults. This includes numerous reasons, both 
legally and traditionally. The first reason is that the age of recruitment, set at 18, marries 
up with the age most individuals can participate in the political process, which is true in 
109 countries around the world.26 It is accepted that involvement in the political process 
is a “reasonably accurate” indicator of intellectual maturity.27 The other reason 18 is 
accepted as the age of adulthood could be based on the traditional and historical 
understanding of adulthood. The age of 18 has been used as a milestone throughout 
history. Dating back to the 14th century, an individual could become a knight at the age 
of 18.28 For the purposes of this study, “child soldier” will follow the United States’ 
definition, as outlined in the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008.  
As it has been shown, child soldiers have been used throughout history. There are 
a variety of views as to why the specific issue of child soldiers has grown in importance 
                                                 
25 Center for Law and Military Operations, Legal Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq 1 
(Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2004), 75.  
26 Ann Sheppard, “Child Soldiers: Is the Optional Protocol Evidence of an Emerging ‘straight-18’ 
Consensus?” The International Journal of Children’s Rights 8, no. 1 (January 2000), 49. 
27 Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 7. 
28 Gravett,	English	Medieval	Knight	1300–1400,	16.	 
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around the world, as well as to why the use of child soldiers has been increasing. Many 
scholars believe that there are three common factors that have led to the increasing 
problems of child soldiers: changes in the nature of warfare, the small arms trade with the 
development of “lighter” weapons, and the emergence of the idea of the vulnerability of 
children.  
The first factor, the changes in the nature of warfare, follows the account that 
“small scale civil wars and ethnic conflicts now occupy the center stage of armed 
conflict, as opposed to previous international wars and wars of national liberation.”29 In 
particular, following the Cold War, conflicts have been characterized as “small wars,” 
“low-intensity conflicts,” “asymmetric conflicts,” or “new wars.”30 This blurs the front 
line of the battlefield, putting civilians and children up close to the dangers of warfare, 
where “recruiters” can simply take children from their homes or schools.31 There are no 
well-defined beginnings or ends to these conflicts, often creating a lifetime of fighting, in 
which children have grown up only knowing conflict and war.  
The second factor, which has led to the increase of child soldiers, is the small 
arms trade. Because of the abundance of small arms available around the world, it is 
easier for an organization to acquire and put that weapon into the child’s hand. The 
significant availability of these weapons leads to the increased recruitment and utilization 
of child soldiers. Instead of children participating as cooks, messengers, or powder 
monkeys, they can actively participate as armed combatants, engaging their opponents. In 
2002, there were approximately 639 million small arms in circulation worldwide; that 
equates to about 1 weapon for every 10 people on the planet.32 This was perpetuated by 
the fact that an AK-47 could be purchased for as little as $5 in different countries, 
                                                 
29 Rosen, Armies of the Young, 10. 
30 Sabine Collmer, “Child Soldiers—An Integral Element in New, Irregular Wars?” Connections 3, 
no. 3 (September 2004), 2.  
31 Amy Beth Abbott, “Child Soldiers-the use of Children as Instruments of War,” Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 23 (Summer 2000), 509.  
32 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc., 2002), 63.  
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throughout the world.33 In addition to the abundance of available weapons, weapon 
systems have been simplified in their use; therefore, with only limited training, children 
can be taught all they need to know in order to kill. 34  
The third factor that has significantly led to the child soldier crisis is the 
emergence of the idea that children are vulnerable and innocent, and therefore easily 
recruited. This belief began to gain momentum during the industrial revolution and the 
emergence of formal and industrialized schooling, which shifted away from 
apprenticeships.35 Additionally, Jean Piaget created a developmental model that gained 
widespread attention in the 1960s, and states that “children are basically immature, 
incompetent, and irrational.”36 This model states that the transition through the stages of 
life from childhood to adulthood happen at fixed steps and are naturally determined. 
Children who have not progressed into a mature adult can often believe that war is a 
game; thus they are “easier to condition into fearless killing” and obedience toward their 
adult leaders.37  
Children on the battlefield are growing in numbers, because they provide a quick 
and easy way of replenishing the ranks in that they are viewed as cheap and 
expendable.38 This problem is not going away. If people do not learn from history, they 
are destined to repeat the same mistakes over and over again. The problems of child 
soldiers, documented in the past, resemble those of today.39 There are similarities, but 
also significant differences. One primary difference is the strategy that is being used that 
includes the use of children by terrorist organizations, primarily for psychological effects. 
These children are being used as a propaganda tool, killing prisoners on camera with 
knives and pistols, and not simply engaging the enemy on the battlefield. Whether 
                                                 
33 Peter W. Singer, Children at War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 48.  
34 Ibid., 46.  
35 Rosen, Armies of the Young, 7. 
36 Ibid.,133. 
37 Collmer, “Child Soldiers—An Integral Element in New, Irregular Wars,” 8.  
38 Singer, Children at War, 95. 
39 Werner, Reluctant Witnesses, 2.  
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children are being used as armed combatants on the battlefield, or for propaganda 
purposes, they must be considered during all phases of operations in order to better 
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II. PREPARATION PHASE  
A. CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE RELATING TO THE 
PREPARATION PHASE 
Nearly 70 percent of all child soldiers operate within the ranks of non-state actors, 
but surprisingly this problem is not limited to these violent extremist organizations.40 The 
United States has identified numerous countries, such as Libya, South Sudan, Yemen and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the official government is currently 
recruiting and employing child soldiers. As part of the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 
2008, discussed earlier, the United States is prevented from providing military support to 
these countries. In spite of this mandate, the president can, and has, issued waivers to 
continue to provide military support to numerous foreign governments that employ child 
soldiers.41 This poses significant challenges for soldiers and commanders who will be 
conducting operations within these countries. 
Since numerous military units, both friendly and enemy, use child soldiers, U.S. 
soldiers must be prepared to interact with or use deadly force against child soldiers. It is 
important for soldiers to accomplish this preparation, prior to deployment. A unit’s 
planning and training, prior to deployment, should incorporate and identify key factors 
that can lead to the recruitment and employment of child soldiers.  
As discussed earlier, the Army manual, concerning the protection of civilians, 
identifies that all Army planning accounts for child soldiers, but there are still significant 
gaps that persist. These gaps include the Army manuals that cover the operations process 
and unified land operations do not even mention children.42 Within the context of 
intelligence and preparation for the battlefield, children are only mentioned twice. The 
                                                 
40 Philippe Gazagne, “Engaging Armed Non-state Actors on the Issue of Child Recruitment and Use,” 
in Seen, but not Heard: Placing Children and Youth on the Security Governance Agenda, ed. David 
Nosworthy (Rutgers University, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 248.  
41 Barack Obama, “Presidential Memorandum - Determination with Respect to the Child Soldier 
Prevention Act of 2008,” The Office of the Press Secretary, White House, September 30, 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/presidential-memorandum-presidential-
determination-respect-child-soldier. 
42 ADP 5–0 and ADRP 3-0. 
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first mention is in the section titled “understanding the population,” in which the question 
is posed, in an attempt to determine the population’s long-term economic concerns for 
themselves and their children.43 Within the section titled “sensitive site exploitation,” it is 
stated that a unit needs to understand the enemy’s tactics for concealing information, and 
the possible use of children as couriers.44 The only other mention of children, specifically 
related to intelligence collection or preparation on the battlefield, is in a subset manual 
for intelligence, which is specifically in regard to intelligence support to urban 
operations. It addresses the need to identify the social aspects of the role of children in 
the environment;45 again, not how, or in what way to deal with them, but rather simply 
stating the need to deal with them.  
As opposed to the planning and intelligence assessment of child soldiers, the 
Army has specifically identified the use of child soldiers as an enemy tactic, technique, 
and procedure (TTP) used within regular, irregular, and hybrid threats.46 These TTPs 
have been published in Army training circulars that outline opposition force capabilities 
and tactics.47 These publications are critical in describing how enemy threats use and 
exploit children, but these training circulars are not widely known throughout the Army, 
and their distribution is primarily limited to the Army’s combined training centers (CTC). 
The analysis of enemy threats, in conjunction with the analysis of operational, 
tactical, and civil considerations, is vital to long-term stability and success on the modern 
                                                 
43 Department of the Army, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (ATP 2–01.3) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Army Publishing Directorate, November 2014), 7–20.  
44 Ibid., 10–5.  
45 Department of the Army, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations (TC 2–91.3) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Army Publishing Directorate, December 2015), 1–20.  
46 Regular threat is defined as military forces that are part of nation-states employing recognized 
military capabilities (ATP 2–01.3). Irregular threats are defined as an opponent employing unconventional, 
asymmetric methods and means to counter U.S. advantages (ATP 2–01.3). Hybrid threats are defined as 
diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal 
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ATP 2–01.3). 
47 Department of the Army, Opposing Force Tactics (TC 7–100.2) (Washington, DC: U.S. Army 
Publishing Directorate, December 2011), 15–9, 15–23 and Department of the Army, Irregular Opposing 
Forces (TC 7–100.3) (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Publishing Directorate, January 2014), 6–17. 
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battlefield.48 For the safety and protection of their forces, unit commanders must 
understand their area of operations completely, and have the ability to identify all 
elements that will affect the outcome of their mission. This is extremely important, since 
the adversary, especially the child soldiers among enemy forces, often are able to blend in 
with the general population.  
Another element that must be assessed during mission analysis, are the rules of 
engagement (ROE) for the area of operation where a unit will deploy. The specific ROE 
provide “circumstances under which soldiers may open fire.”49 Depending on where a 
unit is deploying, they will fall under a theater-specific ROE, or the United States 
military’s standing rules of engagement (SROE). These SROE and theater-specific ROE 
must be evaluated and analyzed, prior to deployment, and can be adjusted depending on 
where the mission is located, who is participating in the mission, or if a unit is operating 
as part of a larger multinational coalition. The Army understands how dynamic the 
current operational environment is within the context of new and limited wars and 
identifies that ROE require continual reassessment, in order to ensure effectiveness.50 
This point is extremely important when there is a possibility that a unit will encounter 
child soldiers. 
It is also possible, under specific ROE, that the U.S. has declared any civilian, 
paramilitary, military, or terrorist as hostile, and U.S. forces can engage these individuals, 
for simply being part of this specific group.51 When taken at face value this might seem 
unjust because there are numerous aspects that can be assessed prior to using deadly force 
against an enemy. If an individual does not pose an immediate threat, they should not be 
engaged with deadly force, and other means should be used to detain them. This may be 
applied to children, as well as adults, who are a part of a group, which has been deemed 
hostile. There are numerous ROE’s that a unit can fall under, depending on the enemy, 
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mission, or location. However, currently, the ROE, concerning the engagement of “child 
soldiers [with deadly force], are either weak or non-existent.”52 
Following the mission analysis, the unit commander must consider what training 
needs to be conducted, prior to deployment, to ensure that the unit is prepared for the 
mission. This should include specific information gathered about the projected 
operational environment (e.g., the presence of children), and the ROE that will be 
applicable in that regard.  
This pre-deployment training can range from classroom instruction to training 
exercises at one of the Army’s CTCs: the Joint Readiness Training Center, in Fort Polk, 
LA; the Yakima Training Center in WA; and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 
CA. The classroom portion of the pre-deployment training includes topics ranging from 
area familiarization to ROE briefings. More importantly, there are classes covering law of 
land warfare, which are required to be conducted annually, according to Army 
regulation.53 Surprisingly, as of this research, the issues surrounding child soldiers are not 
included in the current law of land warfare training, even though it has been identified 
that this should be incorporated. 54 
Following classroom instruction, units conduct training exercises at any of the 
pre-deployment CTCs, in order to reinforce what they have already learned at their home 
stations. These CTCs have the ability to adjust training, as needed, in order to meet the 
specific needs of the current rotational unit. A good example to show how the CTCs were 
able to adjust training for a unit, can be seen following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. 
Shortly after units had begun deploying in support of Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, soldiers found themselves interacting with civilians 
more regularly on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to this increase in 
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interaction with civilians, the military began to develop doctrine and training on how to 
better interact and handle civilians on the battlefield and incorporated this training at the 
CTCs. The implementation of civilian role-players, during training exercises, was added 
as units began to rotate through the CTCs prior to deployment.55 This training has 
become very strategic, in order to ensure better preparation for, and understanding of, 
various situations on the modern battlefield.  
The need to further replicate the battlefield is imperative.56 This is highlighted in 
a current military training circular (TC) that covers exercise design. This TC is intended 
to significantly enhance a planner’s ability to replicate a current operational environment 
for training purposes, and child soldiers are identified as a significant issue that should be 
incorporated.57 This TC was written in 2010 and, unfortunately, there has been little or no 
incorporation of children into role-player based scenarios at the CTC’s.  
The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is the proponent 
for all training that is conducted within the Army, complicates the use of children during 
training. According to the TRADOC Contemporary Operational Environment Actors and 
Role Players Handbook “children on the battlefield will either be inferred or portrayed as 
‘young adult’ (age 18 and up),” but then contradicts itself by explaining a training unit 
could use a local scout group to replicate children on the battlefield.58  
The use of children during training is significant, in order to replicate the intensity 
of combat situations. The Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) understands this, 
and has incorporated children into training, on a limited basis. Since children cannot be 
on an official role-player payroll, they are used solely on a volunteer basis, with their 
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parents’ permission. Children are then incorporated into training, after school hours and 
during holidays from schools.59  
In conclusion, the Army has identified the problems and numerous issues 
surrounding child soldiers, through the publication of training circulars. However, this 
information has failed to make it into relevant planning and intelligence doctrine. By 
identifying and analyzing the current Army manuals, numerous recommendations can be 
made in order to begin to fill this gap.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PREPARATION PHASE 
According to a lessons learned report following the early stages of combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. soldiers need to take child soldiers into 
consideration.60 With the emergence of new and irregular wars, the front lines have 
become blurred. The need to assess more than the enemy has become a necessity. This 
being the case, at times, the military can get so focused on the enemy, that they neglect 
the need to assess the civilian aspect of the operational environment. The need to analyze 
all aspects of the battle space is imperative. Failure to identify significant factors, 
possibly leading to unstable conditions, can potentially cause an increase in enemy 
presence in an area. This analysis of the “civil considerations may have equal or greater 
importance” than a simple analysis of the enemy forces themselves.61  
This is not to say that the current military planning, doctrine, or the systems that 
are in place to facilitate success on the battlefield are deficient. It simply means that the 
Army needs to adjust the current process to help identify key aspects concerning child 
soldiers on the battlefield. Again, it is imperative to clarify these factors during the 
planning process, when preparing for military operations. 
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Army commanders currently use the acronym PMESII-PT to define and analyze 
different operational variables.62 When analyzing these operational variables, it is 
important to note that, depending on the information that is obtained, a commander and 
unit can better determine if child soldiers will be present on the battlefield. Conducting 
the analyses of PMESII-PT, and identifying some of the contributing factors, does not 
necessarily mean that child soldiers are present on the battlefield. However, numerous 
contributing factors may increase the likelihood that child soldiers are present. Analyses 
of certain conditions are sufficient indicators that a unit will encounter child soldiers on 
the battlefield and then a unit is able to take vulnerable children and the possibility of 
child soldiers into consideration, as outlined in Army Doctrine and Training Publication 
3–07.6, Protection of Civilians.  
The political aspect of the operational environment is described as “the 
distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government.”63 The political 
aspect must be assessed in order to determine whether or not the government is able to 
effectively control their borders and police its citizens. If not, there is often increased 
corruption, crime, and the expansion of violent organizations, within a state. These 
factors can lead to political instability and an increase in human rights violations, 
especially against children.64 These human rights abuses, including the use of children as 
soldiers, most often go unpunished because the government simply does not have control 
over corruption, and organizations can act without the fear of being arrested or charged.65 
Within the context of political assessment, there is the need to determine whether the 
state itself employs child soldiers. Some factors include: political weakness, internal 
conflict, whether the need to continue fighting is present, and if there has been significant 
deaths of adult soldiers.66  
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Analysis of the economy in the area of operation includes general economic 
factors such as income, consumer issues, standard of living, and poverty within a country. 
When there are issues concerning the economic situation in a country, resentment toward 
the government and a platform for recruitment of insurgents evolves.67 The issue of 
poverty is a significant contributing factor in the recruitment of child soldiers. Some 
would even argue that poverty is the leading factor that contributes to child soldiers.68 
The main argument for this is that children living within an impoverished country can 
become frustrated and easier to manipulate. Therefore, recruitment into the ranks of a 
military or paramilitary force, which can provide food and shelter, may be a welcoming 
change.69  
The social aspect of the operational environment is critical because, within an 
operational area, there can be numerous societies, which can include villages, towns, or 
tribal affiliations. This social structure can be shattered and left deeply divided by internal 
conflicts, where children are at a greater risk of becoming soldiers. This risk comes from 
adults who indoctrinate children into thinking that it is their duty to continue the fight, or 
children have lost a loved one in the conflict, and they want revenge against the people 
they believe are responsible.70 These conflicts can lead to numerous orphans, internally 
displaced persons, and refugee camps, where recruitment and abduction of children to 
serve as child soldiers is rampant.71 
The informational considerations of the operational environment, relates to the 
ability of an organization to collect, process, distribute, and act on information.72 
Information is a key component in the world today, with the increase in the use of social 
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media and other online sharing sites. In addition to how information is collected, units 
need to assess the use of propaganda and the effect is has on the recruitment of children. 
Children are very susceptible to “propaganda because they lack the broad life experiences 
needed to think issues through, critically.”73 Recently, the use of propaganda to recruit 
and appeal to children has increased dramatically, especially within terrorist 
organizations. Print and video propaganda are being used to appeal to impressionable 
young recruits. The use of high tech video recording and multiple camera angles have a 
first-person-shooter-video-game appeal to them.74  
As outlined above, the current operational variables that are studied during 
mission analysis also pertain to the issues of child soldiers. This is a simple, yet 
potentially profound shift in thinking that can affect the planning process, in order to 
assist units in the identification of child soldiers, prior to a deployment. It simply needs to 
be stressed that children may be a part of the operational environment. The identification 
of the child soldiers, within an area of operation, is paramount to mission success.  
The analysis of PMESII-PT factors is a way for commanders to evaluate an 
operational area and is continually refined throughout the course of the deployment.75 It 
should be noted that even though these operational considerations are important, they do 
not in themselves, lead specifically to mission accomplishment. For further analysis, the 
Army uses the acronym METT-TC to determine what will impact a mission in a specific 
area of operation.76 It must be identified, and understood at all levels, that children are a 
key component of both the “Enemy” and “Civilian” elements of mission variables, within 
the aspects of METT-TC. The need to assess the civil considerations as they relate to 
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child soldiers helps to identify specific mission requirements within a specific area of 
operation. 
The analysis of civilian considerations and the operational factors of PMESII-PT 
can help commanders identify specific aspects that can lead to the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers.  It is through the further analysis of the specific area of operation that a 
commander can map out popular locations where the recruitment and abduction of child 
soldiers is prominent. This can occur anywhere on the battlefield to including where 
children live. However, this would require a significant armed force to abduct children.77 
In these villages, children are more susceptible to be recruited or abducted from 
centralized water sources, schools, internally displaced persons or refugee camps, 
orphanages, police stations, and prisons where children tend to be separated from family 
members or adults.78 It is important for a commander to know where these “hotspots” are 
located, in addition to understanding the enemy threat.  
These assessments are critical, because they help commanders identify the 
possibility of child soldiers within their area of operation. However, it is even more 
important, because it helps them understand the situation and context, surrounding child 
soldiers. During mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield, there is a 
“strong need to evaluate the situation of child combatants in context, giving due weight to 
history and circumstances.”79 It is through an in-depth mission analysis, with additional 
focus on the variables listed above, that helps determine whether a child is a victim of 
forced recruitment, or has joined voluntarily. In the U.S. some children are tried and 
convicted as adults in the criminal justice system because of their voluntary actions. The 
same rationale can be used to say that not all child soldiers have been forced to 
participate in battle; it is a voluntary action.80 There are numerous aspects that go into 
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deciphering whether or not a child has been forced to participate in battle or they are 
participating of their own free will. This determination it is not made lightly. 
The analysis of an area of operation also helps a commander identify the enemy’s 
center of gravity (COG), which can be described as a military’s source of power, which 
provides its strength or will to fight.81 When dealing with child soldiers, the COG is 
considered the leadership’s control over children.82 Areas that are identified as a 
significant hotspot that lead to the abduction of children can also be identified as COG. 
This understanding provides the ability to target the leadership or protect the area 
depending on the specific COG. Having this knowledge of the enemy organization, a unit 
can nominate targets to be placed on the target list, to be engaged using lethal or non-
lethal means. 
Following the identification of the possibility of child soldiers within a unit’s area 
of operation, a commander must review and update the ROE as necessary. As a result of 
mission analysis of a significant identified threat and the presence of child soldiers, a 
commander, at any level, can request supplemental ROE or change the current ROE, to 
take child soldiers into consideration.83 This update to the ROE should incorporate steps 
that are to be taken in order to reduce the possibility of lethally engaging child soldiers.84 
If the ROE covers child soldiers, it can reduce the self-doubt in a soldier’s actions. 
Consequently, they will have the confidence, prior to and during deployment, to make the 
choice of whether or not it is appropriate to pull the trigger.  
Following mission analysis and appropriately updating the ROE, child soldiers 
should be incorporated into training. The need to consider child soldiers during training 
events is critical in order to ensure that U.S. Army personnel understand how to react, 
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when and if they encounter child soldiers. The very simple fact of educating soldiers that 
humanitarian law applies to both adults as well as children is imperative. This informs 
and reminds Army units that international humanitarian law and the rules of 
proportionality apply to both children and traditional combatants.85 
Following these basic classes and lectures, which cover the subject of child 
soldiers, simple scenario-based examples and vignettes should be incorporated into 
training in order to discuss the moral and ethical dilemmas of interacting with child 
soldiers. If there is no one at the unit level comfortable with conducting this training, the 
United Nations has begun to develop training for units to receive, prior to deployment. 
This training includes modules for a train-the-trainer approach, online classes, and 
scenario-based vignettes.86 This training is available through the United Nations Institute 
for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, 
which can be conducted at the unit or individual level.  
Children can also be incorporated into training exercises at the CTC’s in the same 
manner as they are incorporated into the SFQC. The children can participate with adult 
family members that are already role players when they are on holidays from school. This 
training is imperative and should be replicated throughout the force, in order to prepare 
members of the military for upcoming combat operations. In addition, it would support 
deploying soldiers if TRADOC issued clarified and refined guidance, concerning child 
role players, to better support units, in conducting such training.  
If the use of child role players is not available through the CTC’s, units must 
understand the need to replicate the operational environment, as realistically as they can 
during training, or attempt to find suitable training elsewhere. Currently, numerous 
companies are attempting to replicate the stress of the environment that combat brings. 
They do this by using a reflective bulletproof material that projects the image of a live 
role-player, in front of the soldiers. The individual soldier has live rounds during the 
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training scenario, and is able to feel the stress of firing live rounds at a “human target.”87 
This type of training can include reflections of children, enabling the soldier to 
understand and learn how to best handle that scenario, prior to deployment.  
If these scenario-based training exercises, with role players, are unavailable, then 
at the very least, the military should provide training material or handbooks to soldiers 
that discuss facts and issues, in regard to child soldiers. These handbooks have been 
developed, published, and are available through UNITAR, but surprisingly the Army has 
not obtained or distributed this handbook to deploying soldiers.88  
Deploying units who fail to understand their operational environment, and are 
unable to implement in the field what they have learned in training, will most likely fail 
during their deployment. The simple need to identify and inform U.S. soldiers that there 
is a possibility that they will encounter child soldiers is imperative, because the first time 
soldiers encounter this scenario, should not be when they are on the battlefield about to 
take a child soldier’s life. If soldiers are put in this position without the proper training 
studies have shown that they will act purely on their emotions.89 Acting on emotions can 
impair a soldier’s decision making, especially when executing combat operations.90 
These impaired decisions can lead to failure that can simply amount to the unsuccessful 
completion of a units specific mission, or worse, it can lead to U.S. soldiers losing their 
lives in combat.  
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III. EXECUTION PHASE 
A. CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE RELATING TO THE EXECUTION 
PHASE 
Army unit personnel need to understand how to deal with child soldiers, once they 
have deployed and are conducting operations. When confronted with the possibility of 
having to kill children, be it for the greater good, in order to protect themselves, or to 
protect others, the act itself still creates moral and ethical challenges for soldiers. This is 
the pressing moral dilemma: on the one hand, the child is a combatant, who presents a 
lethal threat; while on the other hand, he or she is merely a child. This dilemma counters 
American social and cultural norms regarding children.91 The dilemma is not limited to 
engaging children with lethal force, but in all aspects of interaction. The enemy has 
picked up on this, and it has been identified in Army doctrine, that women and children 
are being used to collect intelligence for the enemy. This is because the enemy knows 
that “Soldiers’ cultural bias can create the incorrect perception” that women and children 
do not pose a threat.92 The contradiction arises when a child soldier does pose a real 
physical threat on the battlefield. 
Even though child soldiers can pose a lethal threat, some consider child soldiers 
as “non-responsible threats” or “excusable threats.”93 Regardless of how one labels them, 
child soldiers present a danger to soldiers when they are engaged in conflict. While there 
may be a moral obligation for soldiers to place themselves at increased risk in order to 
ensure the safety of noncombatants, there is neither the necessity nor the moral obligation 
to do so if a child soldier poses a significant or immediate threat.. Deploying soldiers 
must be made to understand how to react and conduct themselves, in order to ensure that 
they return home. It is never an easy choice to kill another human being. However, in 
combat, it is even more problematic for a soldier to be faced with the need to kill a child, 
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even in self-defense. While at times, and in certain circumstances, it might be appropriate 
to de-escalate the situation in an attempt to save a life, it is not required.94 Soldiers 
always have an inherent right to self-defense, but conditions must be set. Perhaps 
different actions could be taken, in hopes that the situation does not progress to a level 
where there is the need to kill child soldiers. 
Soldiers must understand how to balance between action and inaction when it 
comes to using deadly force against child soldiers. The military must use all available 
means to successfully complete a mission, neutralize the enemy, and reduce the 
possibility of collateral damage. The use of all available means has been identified on a 
limited basis within military doctrine. According to the U.S. Army manual for protecting 
civilians, certain “provisions,” as well as the “incorporation of nonlethal means” may be 
required, due to the possibility that child soldiers might be present on the battlefield.95 
This is the extent of explanation that is given about the consideration of engaging child 
soldiers. Conversely, the U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual speaks about children in 
general, identifying that soldiers should be cautious around children. This manual goes as 
far as to say that all children should be kept at arm’s length.96 This illustrates the 
contradiction between specific United States Army manuals. One states certain 
provisions should be taken, because not all children are threats, while the other states that 
all children should remain at an arm’s distance. The contradiction identified above shows 
how the U.S. Army has conflicting points of view when it comes to interacting with 
children on the battlefield. 
While conducting combat operations, the U.S. Army has developed TTPs to 
reduce collateral damage and non-combatant casualties. These include specific non-
kinetic operations, kinetic operations, or a combination of the two. One of the primary 
non-kinetic operations conducted by the U.S. Army is the use of psychological operations 
(PSYOP). Army PSYOP has the “primary purpose of saving enemy, as well as friendly 
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lives,” through the use of radio, print or other forms of media.97 Psychological 
Operations has been used extensively during the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and incorporates numerous themes. Through the history of these conflicts there have been 
nine major themes that have been used.98 None of these themes addresses the issues of 
child soldiers, even though child soldiers have been identified as a significant problem. 
For example, a child soldier killed the first U.S. casualty in Afghanistan.99 Even more 
recently, in early 2016, Taliban forces killed a celebrated child soldier who was 
supporting coalition forces.100 The use of PSYOP should be used in conjunction with 
other operations, in order to ensure that all military operations are nested with a specific 
end state. When the need arises to analyze a specific target audience, this can be 
effectively utilized to target child soldiers.  
In addition to the use of PSYOP, military units conducting ground operations 
developed specific TTPs to reduce collateral damage through the use of “tactical 
callouts.” A tactical callout is a form of military operations, where a unit cordons off a 
local target, and “calls out” the enemy to give up and surrender. The purpose of a tactical 
callout is to get the individuals within the target area to surrender, with minimal risk to 
friendly forces, as well as noncombatants. Tactical callouts have been used during current 
operations, conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have been very successful in reducing 
friendly as well as enemy casualties. 
The commander must identify that the target area is secure and isolated in order to 
ensure that the enemy forces do not have the ability to flee the objective. Some 
individuals believe that the U.S. military should leave an avenue of escape for units that 
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employ child soldiers, but this simply allows the enemy to engage U.S. forces at a later 
date; such a tactic only perpetuates the child soldier crisis.101  
In conjunction with a callout, most units use escalation of force (EOF) measures, 
which are the “sequential actions that begin with nonlethal force measures, and may 
graduate to lethal measures to include warning, disabling, or deadly shots to defeat a 
threat and protect the force.”102 The use of EOF helps with the application of 
proportionality, and “refers to using lesser means of force, when such use is likely to 
achieve the desired effect.”103 Even though EOF might be necessary to attempt to de-
escalate the situation, EOF does not limit the right of self-defense, or the use of deadly 
force if necessary, in order to defend oneself from an imminent threat, hostile act, or 
hostile intent. As with a callout, EOF measures that encourage the enemy to disperse and/
or retreat can be counter-productive, because it only delays the encounter with the 
enemy.104  
According to operational law, “when time and circumstances permit, soldiers 
should attempt to use lesser means of force to respond to a threat.”105 One means of using 
a lesser means of force, is through the use of nonlethal weapons (NLW), which is defined 
specifically as a potential response to child soldiers. 106 The use of NLW should not be 
confused with the nonlethal means of targeting, such as PSYOP, as mentioned above.107 
The use of NLW can include the use of stun grenades, flash bang, 9-bangers, 12 
gauge or 40mm point and area rounds, chemical irritants, or impact weapons. The use of 
chemical irritants or riot control agents, have been used within the United States by law 
enforcement personnel to disperse riots and could be used with the same effectiveness by 
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the U.S. Army when a unit encounters child soldiers.108 It can be said that all necessary 
means should be available, including the use of NLW, in order to accomplish a mission. 
Primarily protecting U.S. service members and, if appropriate, the lives of enemy 
soldiers, to include child soldiers, is essential.  
Through the use of PSYOP and NLW, U.S. soldiers may find themselves in 
control of detained child soldiers. There are significant numbers of child soldiers who are 
simply waiting for conflict to break out, so they can run away from the organization that 
has kidnapped them or is using them against their will.109 When conducting combat 
operations, soldiers need to understand what to do if they capture or detain child soldiers. 
The issues surrounding the detainment of child soldiers are significant, and the U.S. 
Army has limited guidance surrounding these issues. According to military doctrine, 
child soldiers should be segregated from adult soldiers if they are detained.110 Army 
Judge Advocate Generals have provided guidance to units that have detained children by 
informing soldiers to use the Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC) and Additional 
Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention as a guide even though the United States is not a 
party to these documents.  These lawyers recommended that the standards of treatment 
outlined in these documents can and should be “used as a guide for the treatment of 
children in U.S. custody.”111 
There are limited references within military doctrine concerning child soldiers 
when it comes to interacting with them on the battlefield during the conduct of operations 
—here referred to as the “Execution Phase.” One sentence, in a single manual, does not 
provide support to the U.S. soldiers who will deploy and face child soldiers. There are 
numerous recommendations that can be made in an attempt to combine the kinetic and 
non-kinetic operations, in order to reduce the possibility of killing child soldiers. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXECUTION PHASE 
When conducting combat operations, different steps can and should be taken in an 
attempt to set conditions such that a unit will only have to engage child soldiers with 
deadly force as a last resort. If it is possible to save a child soldier’s life, then it is 
necessary to attempt all available means to do so. The use of deadly force is appropriate 
after all other options have been exhausted. 
The use of PSYOP can be very effective and it has been noted that former child 
soldiers “are widely considered by other child soldiers to be particularly trustworthy 
sources of information.”112 Since the Army currently does not have any policies, themes, 
or messages that consider child soldiers, I will next outline some potential messaging that 
can be used to effectively target all the aspects surrounding child soldiers. One of the 
most important aspects of PSYOP is the need to conduct a target audience analysis. There 
are three target audiences that should be addressed for PSYOP conducted in support of 
operations dealing with child soldiers.  
The first audience is the enemy leadership that employs child soldiers. The 
message that should be used to target the leadership is one that informs them that they are 
breaking national and international laws, by violating International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). They will be held accountable and will face legal ramifications, with the 
possibility of being tried for war crimes, in their use and abuse of children as child 
soldiers. 
The second audience that should be targeted is the local population. The 
messaging should include refusal of support to a group’s use of child soldiers, and 
reporting of groups, within the area, that are using child soldiers. Additionally, PSYOP 
can appeal to a society’s local customs and norms, by identifying the lack of honor in 
using child soldiers to fight “adult wars.” 113 There is also the need to inform the local 
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villages that they should accept former child soldiers back into their villages, for 
reintegration purposes. 
The third and final audience that can be targeted through the use of PSYOP are 
the child soldiers themselves. The messaging themes should encourage them to stop 
fighting. This should include information about how they can demobilize, turn 
themselves in without fear of punishment, and be reintegrated into society. 
In addition to PSYOP, lethal targeting of the leadership should be used. During 
the mission analysis, targets and centers of gravity can be identified as the leadership’s 
control over the children.114 The targeting of the leadership personnel “enables coalition 
forces to pressure, leverage and desynchronize an enemy.”115 This is even more true for 
units that employ child soldiers. If the leaders are taken out of the equation, the units 
employing child soldiers fall apart. As for specific leadership targeting, the U.S. has 
become extremely proficient at kill-capture missions within Iraq and Afghanistan. It has 
been identified that in approximately 80 percent of the raids targeting a specific 
individual, a single shot has never even been fired, and these operations are successful “a 
little over half the time.”116 Even if these raids were not deemed successful because they 
failed to kill or capture their intended target, these operations still disrupt the enemy 
organization. These operations should be used to target the leadership of child soldiers, in 
an attempt to desynchronize the enemy forces. If an Army unit can effectively target the 
leaders, then the members of the unit will be less likely to engage child soldiers on the 
battlefield. The effective targeting of the leadership over child soldiers also shapes the 
battlefield for future operations. 
If specific raids that target leaders are not effective, other conditions can be set to 
reduce the likelihood of taking the life of a child. During combat operations, when a unit 
is facing child soldiers, they need to understand and effectively use EOF measures, with 
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additional caveats. Traditional EOF has turned into something it is not: a threat 
assessment tool, and there is a significant difference between the two. Soldiers must be 
trained on a threat assessment process, in order to determine a potential threat, with the 
ability to use judgment-based use of force.  
With traditional EOF procedures, a soldier has to start off at the bottom, with the 
least amount of force, and work his way up, only after the previous step has failed. 
Conversely, with judgment-based-force, soldiers can immediately “use a degree of force 
appropriate to defeat the degree of threat presented.”117 If soldiers are required to follow 
traditional EOF, it takes time the soldiers may not have when dealing with a potential 
threat. When facing a determined enemy, the price of failure or wasting precious time 
following EOF, can be severe. With judgment-based-force, soldiers can select the 
“appropriate level of force to counter the threat,” without having to follow certain steps, 
as with traditional EOF techniques. 118 
The threat assessment process and judgment-based-force application are valuable 
tools. They can be used to assess threats, protect friendly forces, reduce collateral damage 
and save noncombatants, including child soldiers that do not pose an immediate threat. If 
Army units encounter child soldiers, it is imperative that they understand the need to 
assess the level of threat the child soldier poses, and to use the appropriate amount of 
force, in order to attempt to de-escalate the situation, if possible. 
In an attempt to de-escalate the situation, more consideration should be given to 
child soldiers, based on the threat that they pose. The amount of force used can differ 
from soldier to soldier, and at times be very objective depending on the situation.119 That 
is why the threat assessment process is so imperative. Soldiers must incorporate 
effectiveness of the threat, when considering hostile act or hostile intent, as it relates to a 
child soldier. The threat posed by a child soldier might be considerably different from the 
threat posed by an adult. Even though more consideration should be taken when dealing 
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with child soldiers, U.S. soldiers should not place themselves in undue danger, in order to 
make the determination to use deadly force.  
If a unit is unable to de-escalate the situation, and a firefight breaks out, the use of 
snipers or designated marksmen should be used to effectively target the leadership during 
engagements. If the leader is effectively targeted during an operation, the entire unit has a 
greater potential of falling apart, which can happen within seconds of the leader being 
killed.120 This can lead to numerous child soldiers being detained by U.S. Army units. 
The U.S. military should provide additional guidance in regard to the detention of child 
soldiers. This updated guidance should not simply refer to international law, which the 
United States is not party to, or which deploying soldiers have not been trained in. There 
are numerous manuals and training aspects that military units already know and can 
utilize, when it comes to dealing with child soldiers. The need to reference already known 
doctrine is imperative. It would give soldiers a base line of knowledge, prior to the 
development of new policy.  
During initial entry and pre-deployment training, soldiers are taught about the five 
S’s, as they relate to handling detainees or individuals under their control. These five S’s 
are: segregate, search, silence, speed to the rear, and safeguard the entire time.121 U.S. 
soldiers should be trained to understand that special considerations, and even more care, 
must be applied, when implementing the five S’s to children. 
As discussed above, Army doctrine identifies there is a need to segregate the 
children from the adults, if they are detained. One of the primary reasons for this is that a 
child may be too scared or intimidated to answer questions, if he or she is in close 
proximity to an adult. Also, the adult soldiers may attempt to get the child soldiers to lie 
on their behalf and provide false answers to questions.122 After the child soldiers are 
segregated, they should be questioned so as to attempt to determine age. This can also 
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present problems because not all societies keep track of birthdays. One of the best ways 
to determine age, if birthdays are unknown, is to ask indirect questions that can include: 
do you remember certain historical events? This documents another reason why pre-
deployment mission analysis is important so that soldiers have a working knowledge of a 
country’s history. Following questions about age, commanders and units should limit 
their questions, in order to obtain relevant information of tactical value. Questions about 
past operations that a child soldier may have been forced to conduct could only intimidate 
or alienate them. 
There have been cases where children have not been searched solely because they 
were children.123 This should not be the case; it is an issue that needs to be addressed by a 
unit’s commander and understood by the soldiers within a unit. This simple act of 
understanding can potentially save the lives of U.S. soldiers as well as a life of a child 
acting against his or her will to carry out violence on behalf of a violent group. 
The entire time child soldiers are under the control of an Army unit they must be 
safeguarded. Part of safeguarding is the need to provide medical care. Unit medics need 
to be trained in and have a basic understanding of pediatric medicine. The knowledge of 
pediatric medicine can pay off in numerous areas, not limited to caring for child soldiers, 
once detained. This knowledge can also pay off when conducting operations where there 
is a need to “win the hearts and minds” of a local population. The need for an 
understanding of pediatric medicine is only compounded when conducting operations, 
where child soldiers are present. Unit medics need to be prepared to provide support and 
treatment for the primary injuries that affect child soldiers. These may include: loss of a 
limb, loss of eyesight, loss of hearing, and malnutrition.124  
Finally, child soldiers need to be evacuated, “speed to the rear,” and handed over 
to the appropriate agency. The timeline for evacuation can depend on the country, region, 
or operational environment. Situation permitting, there should be no more than 48 hours 
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from capture until a child soldier is turned over to the proper authorities.125 In some cases 
or countries, such as in the Philippines, children captured are to be turned over in less 
than 24 hours.126 The proper authorities differ, depending on the region, country, or the 
status of forces agreement that a unit falls under. These authorities can range from host 
nation government, to nongovernment organizations (NGOs), to even the U.S. Army if 
they pose a significant threat. This needs to be identified prior to Army units detaining 
child soldiers. 
Throughout the execution phase, commanders and U.S. soldiers must understand 
how to deal with child soldiers. Whether it an Army unit needs to engage child soldiers 
with lethal force or detain them if necessary, soldiers must be prepared. Child soldiers 
who are fighting against their will are likely to flee once the fighting begins. This is 
important to note because soldiers should not impulsively attack and kill children. 
Conversely, U.S. soldiers should be prepared to take a child soldier’s life, when 
absolutely necessary. As a result, the Army unit may have low morale and “undermine a 
unit’s cohesion and combat effectiveness.”127 If soldiers are effectively trained in this 
area, and are confident that they exhausted all other options, but had to use lethal force as 
a last resort, then these effects on the unit could be lessened. Soldiers need to possess 
sound judgment when making decisions in combat, which is based on “personal values 
[reinforced] in training, and guided by commander’s intent.”128  
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IV. STABILIZATION PHASE 
A. CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE RELATING TO THE 
STABILIZATION PHASE  
Following combat operations, units move into the stabilization phase, which is 
most important because it provides the ability for a unit to transition and withdraw from 
an area of operation. The previous two phases discussed primarily dealt with tactical level 
considerations that commanders can consider when they are confronted with the issues of 
child soldiers.  The stabilization phase is more focused on the operational and strategic 
levels because it is not the responsibility of a single commander to transition or withdraw 
his or her unit from an area of operation. This phase is also extremely complex, with the 
addition of host nations forces and numerous civilian agencies, to include NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and organizations from the United Nations. U.S. 
soldiers need to understand how to manage all these assets in order to ensure that an area 
is effectively transitioned to host nation forces. An example of the complexity and the 
number of agencies that can potentially be involved was shown during the 2001 United 
Nations Special Session on children to which over 3,000 different NGO’s were 
invited.129  
This significant number of NGO’s clarifies the importance of the numerous issues 
surrounding child soldiers. One of the most significant challenges concerning child 
soldiers post conflict is their reintegration back into society. The process of reintegration 
is important because child soldiers potentially have nowhere to go. The reason for this is 
that numerous child soldiers are forced to kill family members when they are abducted 
from their villages, in an attempt to alienate them from being able to return home.130 The 
reintegration process is outlined in Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child but is not limited to child soldiers.  This article also identifies that the reintegration 
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process is the same for all children who are affected by armed conflict, exploitation, or 
abuse. The reintegration process for child soldiers is extremely important. Although it 
takes considerable time and resources, it helps to “ensure that the cycles of violence are 
not perpetuated.”131  
Since there are numerous NGOs that are attempting to improve the lives of child 
soldiers, they will inevitably cross paths with U.S. Army units on the ground. When these 
paths cross, coordination is key. Virtually all NGO’s interact with the Army in some way, 
but the extent of cooperation varies considerably.132 This cooperation is necessary to 
support mission accomplishment, as outlined in the Department of Defense Directive 
3000.05, “integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful 
stability operations.”133 The difficulty lies in the fact that each NGO is unique. “No two 
have exactly the same objectives, missions, operating procedures, or capacities.”134  
One way to simplify this friction is for unit headquarters to operate with a Civil 
Affairs (CA) team. “CA elements can liaise, coordinate, and synchronize efforts with 
appropriate U.S. Government, HN [Host Nation], intergovernmental [IGO], 
nongovernmental [NGO], and international organizations, in order to leverage all 
available resources and ensure unity of effort.”135 This can be very effective and 
necessary when dealing with numerous agencies. In addition to NGOs, CA teams also 
coordinate extensively with the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). USAID has worked previously on providing support to child soldiers and, in 
                                                 
131 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Child and Armed Conflict, 
“Release and Reintegration,” United Nations, Accessed on January 20, 2016, 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/release-and-reintegration/. 
132 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations (JP 3–08) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2011), IV-12.  
133 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Stability Operations, DoD Directive 3000.5 (Washington, 
DC: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2009).  
134 Lynn Lawry and Grey Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military: A 
Primer for the Military about Private, Voluntary, and Nongovernmental Organizations Operating in 
Humanitarian Emergencies Globally, (International Health Division, Center for Disaster and Humanitarian 
Assistance Medicine, Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences and U.S. Department of Defense, 
2009) 7, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf. 
135 Department of the Army, Special Operations (ADRP 3–05) (Washington, DC: U.S. Army 
Publishing Directorate, August 2012), 3–14.  
 39
some instances, USAID has been one of the largest providers of support.136 In addition to 
specifically providing support to child soldiers, USAID can act as a “broker” between the 
U.S. Army and all the different NGOs, if there is a specific need.137  
Following combat operations, when a unit is getting ready to withdraw and 
transition they compile an extensive list of lessons learned.  These lessons learned can be 
provided to other units that are preparing to deploy. The Army has now identified this as 
“knowledge management,” which can be defined as connecting people with certain 
information to people who need that information. The Army developed knowledge 
management as a discipline in 2003, and it has been expanded since then. There are now 
knowledge management sections at the Brigade level, all the way through theater 
headquarters.138 The Army knowledge management provides ways to efficiently share 
knowledge, thus enabling learning and understanding throughout various organizations. 
However, there is nothing specific in knowledge management and sharing, as it relates to 
child soldiers. 
There is a significant lack of doctrine as it relates to child soldiers post conflict.  
Army units are responsible for the transition and withdrawal from an area of operation, 
and it is imperative for these units to work closely with other agencies to hand over child 
soldiers that need to be reintegrated into society. There are many potential 
recommendations that can be made to support soldiers, as well as the Army as a whole, as 
it relates to child soldiers post conflict. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STABILIZATION PHASE 
The complexity of the stabilization phase has numerous considerations that must 
be taken into account, when it comes to child soldiers. The need for unity of effort with 
all agencies communicating is paramount. The use of a CA team to coordinate with 
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NGO’s throughout a country is essential. If a team is not attached to a deploying 
headquarters, a CA team should be requested.  
If a CA team or USAID is unavailable to provide assistance, the command level 
headquarters needs to identify what, if any, UN bodies are operating within the 
operational area. Two different United Nations bodies provide assistance with the 
deconfliction between the military and other agencies. The first one is the United Nations 
Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), which was established to 
support “essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in 
humanitarian emergencies.”139 The second UN body provides support for children 
affected by war and has provided significant support to child soldiers. The United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “takes the lead in promoting and implementing 
programs aimed at the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.”140 UNICEF 
has, on numerous occasions, overseen NGOs and IGOs, within an affected area that have 
supported child soldiers.141  
Another possibility which can facilitate coordination, at the strategic level, is for 
the United Stated to establish a NGO military contact group (NMCG). A NMWG was 
established in the United Kingdom (UK) and is chaired by the British Red Cross. The 
British NMCG brings together representatives from the UK’s Ministry of Defense, UK’s 
Department for International Development, and various British NGOs, in order to 
deconflict operations and gain awareness and recognition of other agencies’ positions and 
concerns.142 This is a perfect model for the United States to emulate in order to support 
ground forces that interact with NGO’s. The development of a NMCG by the U.S. would 
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be profound for future operations that incorporate numerous agencies, all working 
together for the same end state.  
One very significant factor that Army doctrine does not mention is the need for 
the U.S. Army to consider the effects of negative messaging, from enemy forces on the 
battlefield. Following an engagement with child soldiers in which children were killed, 
negative messaging “could possibly undermine the strategic object” of the operation.143 
Following combat operations where child soldiers were engaged, the information 
operation (IO) themes and messages should include: deadly force was used as a last 
resort; the unit attempted to do everything in its power to prevent child soldier casualties; 
if children are taken into custody, they are being treated in accordance with international 
law; and the blame for the child soldier casualties should be placed on the groups that 
recruited them.144  
Just as there is a significant need for specific messaging following engagements 
with child soldiers, so too there needs to be specialized reporting across the Army. This 
reporting needs to be provided as soon as possible to the chain of command, in order for 
them to react accordingly. The chain of command needs to be prepared for negative 
blowback from any number of different agencies, and they can also begin to prepare for 
the transfer of child soldiers away from the unit if needed. 
This specialized reporting can also provide important information during the 
compiling of lessons learned conducted following combat operations. The information, 
obtained as lessons learned, needs to be annotated in a standardized format and 
disseminated to other units, whether in the operational area or not. This helps soldiers, as 
well as organizations, and the Army as a whole, learn and adapt to the current operational 
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environment. It also helps commanders gain situational awareness, in order to improve 
their ability to make decisions.145  
These are just a few recommendations of what can be implemented, following 
combat operations. In dealing with child soldiers post-conflict, unity of efforts between 
NGOs, IGOs, the Army, as well as anyone else operating within the AO, is paramount. 
The large number of NGOs that support children throughout the world, in one form or 
another, shows how important it is to have a plan for communication and deconfliction. 
Effective communication is imperative to ensure that child soldiers are handed over to the 
proper agencies and to facilitate their reintegration into society. Additionally, if 
individuals as well as units conduct an operation, and they do not learn from their 
mistakes, and/or do not inform other units of possible complications, then the desired 
outcomes may be forfeited. “Capturing lessons learned is important, but learning the right 
lessons is paramount.”146 The relationships built, communication established, and 
information gained, must be recorded and disseminated, in order to facilitate future 
planning, training and execution of operations, in support of child soldiers. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has presented numerous issues and shortcomings surrounding the U.S. 
military’s doctrine and policy as it regards child soldiers. The military has identified the 
problem through lessons learned and has even noted the problem in doctrine, but has 
failed to implement changes that are necessary in order to support U.S. soldiers when 
they deploy. It has been defined on numerous occasions that the U.S. Army currently 
uses documents and international treaties that the U.S. is not party to, in order to provide 
guidance to Army units about how to conduct themselves when facing child soldiers.147 
These need to be codified, implemented, and distributed to the entire force. This will 
ensure that before a deployment, soldiers fully understand the operational environment 
and the need to take child soldiers into consideration. The need for this refined guidance 
is imperative to facilitate the success of future operations. 
The definitive action of educating and training soldiers for when they may 
possibly have to use deadly force against child soldiers on the battlefield, will surely 
make a significant difference. U.S. soldiers must be prepared, before they are faced with 
an imperative to pull the trigger and kill a child who poses a threat. Even though it might 
be morally and legally justified for a soldier to take the life of a child, it does not make 
the decision any easier.  
The issues surrounding child soldiers are vast and I have simply touched on and 
identified gaps in current Army policy that should be reviewed and possibly updated with 
some of the recommendations presented. This study was not able to solve all problems 
and there are numerous other areas that could be further explored as it relates to the 
Army’s interaction with child soldiers.  For example, further research could be conducted 
on the Army’s role to prevent child soldiers while conducting operations, the Army’s role 
during the reintegration process of child soldiers, and the implications for U.S. units that 
work with partner forces that employ child soldiers. Furthermore, the possible indirect 
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recruitment of children on the battlefield should be examined in order to identify if child 
soldiers are considered liable targets if they are simply providing atmospherics to Army 
units on the ground. 
The issues that surround the use child soldiers are not new, and they will continue 
to be relevant into the foreseeable future. U.S. service members are conducting current 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are targeting insurgent commanders, many of 
whom were once child soldiers.148 The imperative to fully examine this issue, and 
implement concrete direction, fuels the hope for deterring future children from becoming 




                                                 
148 Achvarina and Reich, No Place to Hide, 127.  
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